The Problem with the Problem of Evil
In my own conversion from atheism to Christianity, I had to wrestle with a lot of intellectual objections to both theism, in general, and to Christianity, in particular.
Strangely, however, one obstacle I did not have to overcome was the so-called problem of evil, widely touted as a major challenge for Christianity.
In this post, I want to explain the problem of evil, show why it’s not a problem for Christians, and then explain why it’s actually more of a problem for atheists.
Along the way, I’ll talk about my own view on the problem of evil and hint at how it relates to established theological views.
The Problem
There are many ways to formulate the problem of evil. One particularly confrontational way is as a proof for the non-existence of the Christian God. Formulated in this way, the proof proceeds by contradiction:
Definition: The Christian God is all‑knowing (omniscient), all‑powerful (omnipotent), and all‑good (omnibenevolent).
Assumption: Evil exists, where evil is defined as any instance of suffering or sin.
Proposition: The Christian God exists.
For reductio, suppose Proposition is true. By Definition, if such a God exists, then God knows about every instance of evil, can eliminate every instance of evil, and would want to eliminate every instance of evil.
Therefore, if Proposition is true, evil does not exist. But by Assumption, evil does exist. Contradiction. Hence, Proposition is false.
Therefore, the Christian God does not exist.
As expressed here, the proof is a little squishy, because not all terms are properly defined. However, I have no real objection to a more rigorous formulation, which precisely defines every word in such a fashion as to necessarily imply a contradiction.
Does this imply the Christian God does not exist? Not at all! It only means there is a specific way to define the terms ‘omnipotent’, ‘omniscient’, and ‘omnibenevolent’ such that a god having all three properties cannot exist (assuming ‘evil’ exists).
However, to defend Christianity from the problem of evil, it is not necessary to advance specific definitions of these words. Indeed, one can merely show that Christians define these words in various ways, some of which do not lead to a contradiction.
This is precisely what I will do in this post.
Since, as far as I know, there are no Christians who claim that God is unaware of evil (in any sense), I will not discuss the definition of ‘omniscience’.
Instead, in the next two sections, I will explore omnipotence and omnibenevolence.
Omnipotence
One could define omnipotence as the ability to do anything. However, this definition is too naive to be useful, because it permits absurdities, like God being able to create a rock so heavy that He cannot move it.
At minimum, any coherent notion of omnipotence must be constrained to anything that is logically consistent.
For Christians, that’s not typically enough, because most Christians further stipulate that God cannot do anything that is opposed to His essential nature. For example, God cannot lie, or commit evil, because doing so is contrary to God’s essential nature.
More broadly, God cannot stop being God, and to lie (for example) would render Him not-God, so He cannot lie.
Thus, God’s omnipotence is usually defined by Christians as the ability to do anything that is consistent with logic and with God’s nature.
This is the most narrowly constrained definition that is both consistent and Christian, although broader constraints are possible, too.
Even without broadening these constraints, the problem of evil breaks down immediately if God’s nature somehow prevents Him from eliminating evil.
How could preventing evil render God as not-God?
One possibility, embodied by the theological view of essential kenosis (among others) says that God’s nature requires Him to give man free will. If, as some Christians hold, evil exists precisely because of free will, then preventing evil would render God as not-God.
The Christian view of omnipotence, then, is sufficiently restricted so as to nullify the problem of evil under certain (not uncommon) views of God’s nature.
Now let’s take a closer look at omnibenevolence.
Omnibenevolence
Knowing that omnibenevolence means “all-good” is not that helpful without discussing what is good. Unfortunately, this is not a simple topic.
Theories of goodness range from highly theocentric, in which a thing is good because God has decreed it to be so (pure divine command theory), to highly anthropocentric.
Rather than examining these theories at length, we can take a shortcut by looking at what good must be in order for the problem of evil to be a valid argument against the Christian God.
To generate a contradiction, it must be good (even, potentially, the greatest good) for God to eliminate evil, where evil is defined as any instance of sin or suffering. Is it necessarily good for God to stop sin and to stop suffering?
Many Christians would concur, but they would maintain that God cannot do so without being not-God (see omnipotence).
Virtually all moral secularists would maintain that it is always good to stop suffering, whilst sometimes denying the existence of a separate category of evil called sin. Buddhism, positive/negative utilitarianism, and sentientism all maintain that suffering is bad and it is always good to stop suffering.
To avoid the problem of evil, however, all a Christian must posit is that God’s goodness, however that is ultimately defined, does not imply He must end all sin and suffering.
Far from being a radical theory, the Bible is loaded with examples of God deliberately not preventing sin or ending suffering (Job 1:12, Exodus 9:16). This establishes a proof that the Christian conception of God is not “all-good” in the precise way that a secularist might imagine.
Thus, for the problem of evil to be valid, one must adopt a relatively specific definition of omnibenevolence. A more constrained definition, grounded in ethics that do not consider the elimination of sin and suffering the greatest good for God, does not lead to contradiction.
Reconciliation
So far, I have shown the problem of evil is not a problem with certain common Christian definitions of omnipotence or omnibenevolence.
That is, I have shown it is possible to assert divine omnipotence and omnibenevolence, for some definition of each, which is wholly compatible with both divine omniscience and the existence of evil.
Clearly, no Christian who has deeply studied theology needs to have an incoherent view of God: it is straightforward, even mainstream within Christian theology, to hold views wholly consistent with the existence of evil.
Certainly, some may have unknowingly absorbed certain secular or humanistic conceptions of omnibenevolence (e.g. God is infinitely kind and infinitely loving to humans in a way that must maximize creature-comfort).
No doubt, some Christians have naive definitions of omnipotence, which don’t take into consideration consistency with logic and God’s essential nature.
In both cases, the problem of evil may indeed be a valid argument against their conception of God.
But this is not an argument against the Christian God, per se. It is only an argument against poorly formulated conceptions of the Christian God.
My Solution
I’ve shown that the problem of evil needn’t be a problem for Christians, which is something that was obvious to me as an atheist. However, I have not discussed my own reconciliation.
Although it is not necessary to solve the problem of evil with my own reconciliation, for the curious, and because I believe my solution can withstand deep scrutiny, I will present a sketch of my views here.
My reconciliation rests on a specific understanding of divine goodness that differs from secular conceptions. I maintain that God’s eternal and unchangeable moral goodness manifests in His orientation of all things—including the existence of evil—toward “self-glorification” (a concept that demands separate exposition).
Under this view, God’s kindness toward creatures is not what makes Him good. Rather, God’s acts of kindness, together with acts of judgment, redemption, deliverance, and punishment, are ultimately all expressions of His innate and perfect goodness, which is rooted in the theological view of Divine Self-Glorification (glorificationism as opposed to amorism).
Evil exists because it serves the ultimate end of displaying God’s full depth and range of perfection—His justice through judgment, His mercy through redemption, His power through deliverance, His wrath through punishment.
A world without evil would be a world where God’s glory is diminished, where His perfect character is shining only dimly. Thus, preventing all evil would actually make God less good, not more good, because it would frustrate the very purpose for which He created all things: the full manifestation of His glory.
This means the problem of evil fundamentally misunderstands the nature of divine goodness.
The humanist assumption that a good God must eliminate evil presupposes that creature-comfort is the ultimate aim. But if God’s glory is the ultimate aim, then evil’s existence is not evidence against God’s goodness—it’s a necessary component of creation.
God doesn’t eliminate evil because doing so would undermine the very telos of creation, making Him act contrary to His perfectly good nature.
Now, I know that in response to this view, many would say, “If God has the power to eliminate evil, and if God chooses not to eliminate evil (for whatever reason), then God is morally responsible for evil.”
Some theologians derive complex theories of moral culpability in order to defend against such criticism, both in the presence and absence of total divine sovereignty.
Personally, I believe the best response is Romans 9:21, together with Exodus 3:14 (אֶהְיֶה אֲשֶׁר אֶהְיֶה). No apology is required. God does not need defense; He is God.
The Problem with the Problem
I have shown, both in general and in my particular case, how the problem of evil is not a problem for Christians. I will now argue it is a very serious problem for many atheists.
The reductive naturalist atheist, seeing obvious evil in the world, comes to the conclusion that the Christian God cannot exist.
A sentiment I’ve heard from many such atheists is essentially, “The Christian God cannot exist, and if some other god exists, he is evil and I would rather go to hell than worship him.”
These atheists make two assumptions:
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That good and evil actually exist (“is”).
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That good and evil have binding moral obligations on moral agents (“ought”).
For if these atheists do not assume (1), then they cannot argue that the Christian God does not exist, and they cannot say whatever god might exist must be evil. If they do not assume (2), then the categories of “good” and “evil” become an arbitrary partition on the set of all possible actions, utterly toothless and incapable of producing moral conclusions.
These are, respectively, the easy and the hard problem of morality. Inside of reductive materialism, the hard problem of morality has no solution; and outside of reductive materialism, any possible solution is built on unprovable presuppositions, qualitatively no different than a believer’s faith in God.
In reality, to find the problem of evil a problem, an atheist must assume the very morality that is given solid foundation only in a world where God exists (at least, from the Christian perspective).
So ultimately, the problem of evil, for those who find it a problem, is really one of rebellion against the created order, and against He who made it so.
It’s a child throwing a tantrum because it’s bedtime.
It’s a pottery bowl, angry at the potter for being made from clay rather than iron.
It’s a man of dust, obliviously using his moral sense to role-play moral superiority to the very God who has given him a moral sense, and in Whom all morality is grounded.
A Christian accepts that God is perfectly good, with all knowledge and power, and that evil does exist, and in some sense, this is both a humble surrender to the way things are, and an expression of faith in the perfect character of the One who made them so.
Summary
In summary, the “problem of evil” only works as an argument against the Christian God if you import definitions that most Christians don’t share. But if you adopt Christian definitions of these words, then:
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If omnipotence means doing all that is logically possible and consistent with God’s nature (not the power to be not‑God), then the contradiction disappears.
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If omnibenevolence does not imply God maximizing creature-comfort (as the greatest good), then it disappears again.
So yes—incoherent conceptions of God can be refuted by the problem of evil. But there are numerous conceptions of the Christian God that cannot be refuted.
My own reconciliation is straightforward: God’s goodness is His orientation to His own glory, revealed in creation’s experience of His perfect character. He orders all things—including evil—toward this holy end.
A world without evil would hide justice, mercy, wrath, and redemption. Preventing all evil would therefore be less good, because it would frustrate the telos of creation.
So the problem of evil mistakes divine goodness: it assumes our comfort is the ultimate good, but in reality, it is God’s glory that is the ultimate good.
The atheist who in good faith wields “evil” as a weapon against Christians must assume moral facts and binding obligations. Inside reductive materialism, these assumptions have no ground, and outside it, they rest on faith no different than the believer’s.
In the end, the posture of such an atheist is not logic but sinful rebellion—a tantrum at bedtime; clay rebuking its potter; a man of dust pridefully boasting to be more moral than the very Maker who bestowed upon him his moral senses.
A Christian rejects this rebellion, and submits to the way things are and to the way they must be. God is all‑good, all‑knowing, and all‑powerful, and evil exists.
The existence of evil should not be meekly and awkwardly apologized for by embarrassed Christians who have unknowingly absorbed a secular ethics.
Instead, we Christians should confidently and savagely defend the existence of evil as part of a sovereign plan that serves the ends of God, rather than the comfort of man.
And we should be eternally humble and grateful that, by God’s perfect and good nature, all vessels of God’s mercy get to experience the immense riches of His glory.